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The Journal of Transatlantic Studies is the official journal of the Transatlantic Studies Association. It is a multi- and inter-disciplinary publication embracing history, international relations and security studies, literature and culture, economic and business history, transnational connections, and environmental studies. Themed issues are published regularly, and have covered the impact of 9/11, the Anglo-American relationship, NATO’s contemporary challenges, Canada and transatlantic relations, and US Secretaries of State.

Broadly speaking, the journal contains articles on relations between Europe and North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean. Editorial policy is suitably flexible about the inclusion of Africa. While the majority of articles will almost certainly be on North American relations with Europe, there is an editorial policy of including articles dealing with Spanish, or Portuguese or French speaking America (Dutch speaking America/Caribbean will be dealt with on a case by case basis).

Most contributions are about post-1945 or contemporary affairs, but articles covering any period of transatlantic relations are welcome.
For more information, see the journal’s webpage.

Editor Professor Alan Dobson, Honorary Professor, Swansea University

Publisher: Palgrave-Macmillan

Special Issue on 50th anniversary of Henry Kissinger becoming National Security Adviser to President Nixon

Journal of Transatlantic Studies vol 17(i) March 2019


‘Henry Kissinger’s Three Europes’
By Mario Del Pero, Sciences Po, Paris

This article discusses the three Europes that informed Kissinger’s narrative of world affairs and Transatlantic relations: Europe as history offering vital lessons the United States was called to study and master; Europe as a junior (and subaltern) ally of the U.S.; Europe as the primary Cold War theater and, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the object of superpowers’ détente. The article highlights how these three narratives were used in the attempt to build a new domestic consensus around a foreign policy still driven by basic Cold War imperatives, the limits and contradictions of this attempt, and its ultimate failure.

‘Re-Configuring the Free World: Kissinger, Brzezinski, and the Trilateral Agenda’
By Jussi Hanhimäki, Graduate Institute, Geneva

Did Henry Kissinger’s 1973 ‘Year of Europe (and Japan)’ – initiative fall flat? Not at all, this essay argues. By focusing on the roles of Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who together dominated much of US policymaking in the 1970s (and shared a European background), I will argue that such initiatives as the G-7 and the CSCE reshaped the relationship between the United States and its major European allies (and Japan) in a way that reflected the changing international environment but did not dilute America’s dominant position as the leader of the ‘West’.

‘A Preponderance of Stability. Ostpolitik and Henry Kissinger’s Ambivalent Relationship with Germany’
By Stephan Kieninger, Johns Hopkins University

This contribution looks into Henry Kissinger's ambivalent relationship with Germany scrutinizing both the parallels between Kissinger's détente and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik as well as the frictions and the competition between both approaches. Examining Kissinger's initial doubts over Ostpolitik's feasibility, the essay depicts his way to control the détente process in Europe through the Quadripartite negotiations over Berlin in 1971. Eventually, Ostpolitik's success was a catalyst and a prerequisite for Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's own approach to the Soviet Union.

‘Forgetting Kissinger: Re-membering Credibility & World Order?’
By David Ryan & Elizabeth Tanner, University College Cork

Henry Kissinger has a formidable influence on US foreign policy. He not only exerted a disproportionate level of power and influence in the Nixon administration, but also continued to build and maintain his reputation in the years after the White House. He was deeply concerned with his perceptions of world order and the memory of his reputation. Though he has been widely consulted and feted by subsequent administrations a core element of his decisions and advice, centred on the use of violence, have largely been ignored: he is seen everywhere, but largely forgotten. The consequences of his foreign policy decisions and advice – the deaths of civilians – have been elided from collective memory. The article examines issues of his credibility, realism and conception of world order; it engaged two case studies: South Asia and Mayaguez by way of illustration.

‘A Frankenstein Monster’: Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and the Year of Europe
By Thomas Schwartz, Vanderbilt University

“A Frankenstein Monster’: Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and the Year of Europe,” tells the story of the severe crisis in US-European relations when Henry Kissinger was directing American foreign policy. Referencing contemporary concerns over the Trump Presidency’s harsh rhetoric and actions toward the European Union, the article demonstrates that such tensions have a long history in the US-European relationship, and are rooted in the concerns of American domestic politics, which Henry Kissinger well understood. Kissinger’s policy choices during the crisis represented the dilemmas that exist between domestic political priorities and alliance relationships, and may hold lessons for today’s US-European relationship.

‘Henry Kissinger and the Transition to Democracy in Southern Europe’
By Sotiris Rizas, Academy of Athens

Henry Kissinger’s approach to the dilemma between authoritarianism and democracy was based on a rather pessimistic view that mass politics would lead to negative outcomes for US strategic interests. The nature of political regimes should be left to domestic factors. What mattered to the US was security and, in broad terms, the stability of international politics.

The Revolution of the Carnations in Portugal in April 1974, regime change in Greece in July 1974 and the anticipated end of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain exacerbated Kissinger’s concerns. The secretary of state looked for ways to mitigate the damage to NATO having in mind the need to prevent a lurch to the left in France and Italy, allied countries with strong Communist Parties.