

# *The* TRANSATLANTIC STUDIES ASSOCIATION

## Chair's Report - 2018

*Professor Christopher Jespersen, UNG*



**Hosted by University College Cork**, the 2017 TSA conference attracted scholars from both sides of the Atlantic and featured exciting and engaging panels across multiple disciplines. UCC was well suited to host, having previously hosted TSA in 2012 and 2007. TSA Chair David Ryan and his team ensured a delightful experience for all, and our thanks and gratitude go to David and all at UCC.

**At the 2017 conference**, the Management Committee agreed to hold the 2018 annual meeting at the University of North Georgia's Dahlonega campus. This was the first time the TSA would hold its annual meeting on the other side of the Atlantic.

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Editor – Kristin Cook  
SOAS University of London

## TSA-CUP Book Prize



In partnership with Cambridge University Press, the TSA is pleased to award the Book Prize for 2016 titles to Dr. Dino Knudsen:

*THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: INFORMAL ELITE DIPLOMACY, 1972-82* (ROUTLEDGE, 2016)

As the incoming TSA Chair, and host for 2018, I promised to do my best to replicate the wonderful hospitality and engaging discourse I had experienced at so many TSA conferences since I started attending in 2008 in Dundee, Scotland.

The 2018 program has a healthy mixture of experienced TSA conference goers as well as a nice batch of first-timers. There are panels on the Middle East in transatlantic relations, security, migration, power relations in literature, and cinema. There's one paper on the transatlantic horse trade, and another explores transatlantic light therapy. We have scholars coming from Berlin, and a paper on Basque immigrants in the western sheep industry. In short, there's an eclectic array of papers and panels, and, of course, there will be discussion of Donald Trump and his administration in light of transatlantic relations.

The conference will conclude Wednesday night at the Wolf Mountain Winery, a 10- to 15-minute drive from the Dáhlonega campus. When people think of North Georgia, they don't generally think of wine, but the region, like many others around the United States and elsewhere, has found the local altitude, regular sunshine, and plentiful rainfall make for the right conditions to grow certain varieties of grapes. Because the region is so hilly, Wolf sits on property that has stunning views.

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*The Aula Maxima,  
University College Cork  
17<sup>th</sup> Annual TSA Conference*



*TSA 2017 Roundtable (from left): David Ryan (University College Cork), Liam Kennedy (University College Dublin), Kathy Burk (University College London), Thomas Mills (University of Lancaster), Carl Hodge (University of British Columbia), Alison Holmes (Humboldt State University)*

**WE CONGRATULATE HALLE FOUNDATION TRAVEL  
GRANT RECIPIENTS FOR ADVANCING THE STUDY OF  
GERMAN-ATLANTIC RELATIONS:**

**REBEKAH MCMILLAN, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS (2018)**

**NADJA KLOPPROGGE, FREE UNIVERSITY BERLIN (2017)**

**SÉBASTIEN TREMBLAY, FREE UNIVERSITY BERLIN (2017)**



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## THE RISE, FALL, AND REDEMPTION OF THE BRITISH-AMERICAN SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP\*

RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES

**REMEMBERING WORLD WAR I AS A POINTLESS BLOODBATH**, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic looked for solutions. The League of Nations, United Nations and European Union were all attempts at conflict resolution. Nuclear deterrence and a balance of power between nuclear arsenals seemed to serve a peaceful purpose until recent proliferations. Another recourse has been secret intelligence, developed in the twentieth century on a scale never previously matched. Intelligence can help you to win wars more quickly, more cost effectively, and with fewer collateral casualties. But it is also a powerful tool in the prevention of conflict, in the policing of peace, and in the pre-emption of terrorist attacks.

Cooperation has been a prominent feature of secret intelligence – it allows the pooling of thoughts and resources. Here, trust is an important element. The British-American intelligence relationship was the dominant example of international trust and cooperation in matters of espionage in the twentieth century – we know it as the *special* intelligence relationship (SIR), an intelligence relationship like none other on the planet. However, if that is our definition, it is a finite partnership that has had a beginning, a middle, and, I propose, an end.

The *concept* of the SIR originated with Winston Churchill, even if the practices of the SIR predated his years as prime minister. As every reader of this *Newsletter* will know, Churchill introduced the term ‘special relationship’ in his Fulton, Missouri speech of 1946, in which he announced that an ‘iron curtain’ had descended across Europe. He discreetly made no mention of the special relationship’s intelligence dimension on that occasion, but he was an intelligence enthusiast, and its inclusion was implicit.

Does the iron curtain context of the Churchillian rhetoric mean that the special relationship was a distinctly Cold War phenomenon? That would have ominous implications for the health of the relationship post- Cold War. In fact, the future of British and American intelligence agencies, whether or not they cooperated, did look bleak for a while in the 1990s. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan led a serious campaign for the abolition of the CIA. The intelligence agencies cast about for new missions in the period between the collapse of European communism and the emergence of the international terrorist threat. Over here, for example, MI5 seized control of Northern Ireland security and the war against serious organized crime. With the future of individual agencies uncertain, the prospects for liaison were not bright, either – you can’t have a special relationship without the other.

But while the Cold War may have had a unifying effect on American and British intelligence, it was not the quintessential cement. The U.K. and the USA had had a special intelligence relationship *before* 1946. For example, in the Spanish-American War of 1898, Britain gave material assistance to the US Secret Service when it broke up Spain’s spy ring centred in Montreal, while in World War I, the English novelist Somerset Maugham spied on Bolshevik Russia and received half his salary in dollars. *After* the Cold War, too, the notion of the special relationship survives, and that includes its intelligence dimension. Senior figures in the UK intelligence community still cling to the SIR like a dog with a favourite old bone.

**RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES** is emeritus professor of American history at the University of Edinburgh. In 1999 he founded the Scottish Association for the Study of America, and is currently honorary president. He is the author of *In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence* (OUP, 2013). His book *The American Left: Its Impact on Politics and Society since 1900* (Edinburgh UP, 2013) received the Neustadt Prize for the best British book on American politics or political history in a given year.



The special intelligence relationship has nevertheless been problematic from its beginning, and I would argue that since the 1960s the difficulties have become more acute. The problem was evident in the vital realm of codebreaking. Britain had a start on America in both world wars. In World War I, Room 40 cryptographers intercepted German cable and radio messages. Provocatively, these Admiralty whizz-kids refused to pass on to their American counterparts decryption expertise, making available only the translated decodes.

At first, history repeated itself in World War II. Early in the war, Prime Minister Churchill asked, 'Are we going to throw all our secrets into the American lap? If so, I am against it. It would be much better to go slow, as we have far more to give than they.' However, the sharing of cryptographic secrets in World War II did take place and was the pinnacle of the special intelligence relationship. In part because of the computerisation of codebreaking, the Americans now began to pull ahead. The UKUSA signals intelligence (SIGINT) agreements that followed in the wake of Churchill's Fulton speech tied together the 'Five Eyes' white Anglophonic nations, Canada, New Zealand and Australia being the other signatories. America now held the trump cards; harmony ruled.

Post-1960s, a trajectory of periodic, confidence-sapping SIGINT letdowns set in. When Ted Heath failed to toe the Henry Kissinger line on European integration, the United States threatened to cancel its intelligence and nuclear agreements with the U.K. The flow of information from NSA and CIA to their British counterparts temporarily slowed down. Memories of this event were still vivid enough to haunt the government of John Major. In the course of the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s, there was U.S. displeasure at British policy. It again appears to have resulted in an effort at intelligence starvation. The BBC journalist Sheena McDonald asserted that in late 1994 the 'supply of intelligence to the British was temporarily cut off, causing panic in Whitehall'.

In 2000, the incoming Bush administration warned Tony Blair to cool his plans for a European Union Army. Its spokesman John Bolton said such an artefact would be 'leaky'. He said the 'unique bilateral relationship is coming under intense strain.' He added, 'The special U.S. U.K. relationship in intelligence rests fundamentally not on architecture, but on trust.' That word 'trust' again.

In spite of frequent professions of faith in the SIR, it was no longer what it used to be. Since the 1960s, it had become apparent that the UK was not the intelligence partner of old. The British Empire was dying. The Cambridge spy ring – Kim Philby et al. – all but destroyed trust in British reliability in clandestine matters. In American discourse, one heard less and less about the special relationship. Writing about it in the early 1990s, the political journalist John Dickie noted 'the term is rarely heard in Washington – even in the British Embassy'.

America was becoming less Anglo-Saxon, and more oriented to the Pacific. According to a survey in September 2011, only 38% of Americans felt the EU as a whole – let alone the UK – was important to their national interests, while more than half of those polled saw Asian countries as important. As for British public opinion, the *Observer* commissioned a comparison of attitudes in 1963 and 2013. In 1963, 36% of those polled thought the UK should have very close ties with the USA. The 2013 figure was 14%. All this was well before the Donald Trump fracas.

When I was writing *In Spies We Trust*, the first edition of which came out in 2013, I thought that the solution was for the USA to pursue its revised relationships across the globe while remaining friendly to the UK, and for the UK to look to enhancing intelligence cooperation within the European Union. In The Hague there was Europol, brilliantly led by Rob Wainwright, and a model fight against serious organized crime and terrorism. In Brussels, there was the European Council's SITCEN, an embryonic intelligence analysis France brought to the table its satellite launching capability. Could the fruits of GCHQ be thrown into the European Union mix?

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*TSA 2017 (from left): TSA Chair, David Ryan (University College Cork),  
Keynote Speakers: Liam Kennedy (The Clinton Institute, University College Dublin)  
Sheila Rowbotham (Universities of Manchester and Bristol)  
Alan Dobson (Swansea University)*

#### **Chair's Report - Continued**

Speaking of hills, I would be remiss if I did not remind everyone who attended TSA in Cork: the Dählonega campus is hilly. I strongly urge that you wear comfortable shoes, and given that July temperatures can often reach 30-32 degrees Celsius, by the power vested in me as the TSA Chair, and in my capacity as the 2018 host, I hereby proclaim the 2018 TSA Conference's official attire to be business casual. You will not see me in a jacket or tie the entire conference, and I suggest you dress comfortably for the hot weather. A portable umbrella would also be wise as local thunderstorms are not uncommon.

Our good friend, Alan Dobson, and editor of the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* will be in attendance and will report on behalf of the journal. The Management Committee will review a proposal to host the 2020 conference in Lisbon, Portugal. (Remember, TSA 2019 is already set for Lancaster University.) The program has another strong DC Watt panel, we will award the TSA-Cambridge University Press prize for best book on a transatlantic topic, and we've got another round of TSA travel grants as well as supporting grants from the Halle Foundation for deserving scholars.

The financial health of the organization is solid. With the conference moving to Ghent in 2014 and Middleburg in 2015, and with TSA now coming to the United States, the organisation is fulfilling an ambition that came up for discussion some years ago. It will be exciting to reunite with longstanding TSA members, and it will be rewarding to meet newcomers. On behalf of the Management Committee and my fellow officers, Tom Mills, Kristin Cook, and Gavin Bailey, we are looking forward to the 2018 conference. See you in Dählonega.

**Professor Christopher Jespersen**  
University of North Georgia  
TSA Chair, 2017-2020

**ATLANTIC STORM:  
ELECTORAL POPULISM IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES\***  
**CARL HODGE**  
*Roundtable Lecture*

**I COMMENT HERE WITH PREJUDICE, AS SOMEONE WHO BELIEVES IN ATLANTICISM,** i.e., the notion that there is and ought to be a community of liberal-democratic traditions values that binds together the peoples of North America and Western Europe. So much of what I have to say will have the tone of lament about the condition of that community in light of political developments on both sides of the Atlantic over the past two years. However, I will not limit my observations to that time-frame, above all because I have a longstanding dispute with governments on both sides of Atlantic for their neglect of that relationship in the best of times and their studied obtuseness about Atlanticism in the worst of times. Not only do I approve of the principle and goal of free trade between North America and Europe; I believe it should have been as established fact as long ago as the late 1980s.

I therefore regard the outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership in June 2016 and the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States the following November as calamitous for the Atlantic Community, liberal commerce, liberal-democratic government, and the ambience of liberal civilization internationally. I am going to comment today on what I see as the short and long-trends that led to these outcomes. I will begin with observations on the condition of contemporary American politics and government, move on to implications for Anglo-American relations and NATO, move on to the possible impact of Britain's divorce from the EU, and conclude with comments on the role of The People in all of this.

### **I Democracy in America**

The United States is a secular republic, which over the course of its turbulent, tragic and often heroic history has been progressively democratised. At its birth John Adams observed that 'there never was a democracy that did not commit suicide,' and we are seeing now how much better was his measure of political man than our own. The decline on the quality of presidential leadership in the United States is only the most visible manifestation of the progressive tribalism of American politics - the last President of the United States who was fully up to the job was George H.W. Bush and was thrown from office in 1992 for *being* up to the job - and scholars such as Richard Pildes have done a more thorough job than I of diagnosing the many sources of the decline in governance.\* As for episodes in the dry rot of the Republican Party specifically, I think that the role of the independent candidacy of H. Ross Perot in ending the Bush presidency with anti-free trade revolt presaged much of what we saw in the Republican Party of 2016 that ultimately nominated Donald Trump.

The reasons for the outcome of the 2016 presidential year in the United States run deeper than can be summarized here. The reasons for the result of the UK referendum do not run nearly so deep. They have more to do with poor judgment of the government of David Cameron combined with remarkable ignorance on the part of voters as to the importance and possible consequences of the question put to them. That it was not obliged to ask the electorate whether the UK should abandon wholesale a commitment it made in 1973 to Europe and had since reconfigured its entire economy according to that



nonetheless and lost the argument for remaining in the European Union, making of Cameron the most spectacular loser among British prime ministers since Anthony Eden. Cameron, however, was simply a product of the mediocrity of the Conservative Party, not a despicable human being and not the towering tribute to corruption that is Donald Trump. Populism is itself often an electoral insurgency against the perceived corruption of the political class and socioeconomic elites it privileges. A cleansing of sorts that can do much damage but also permit the fresh wind of new ideas to bring positive change.

But populism also often incorporates the notion that innocence born of ignorance is the antidote to the arrogance born of expertise. Any of us who had to hire a plumber would naturally seek to avoid hiring a “corrupt” plumber, but our standard for an honest plumber surely would not require that he know nothing about plumbing. The tragedy in the case of Donald Trump is that the American electorate has hired a corrupt plumber who nonetheless knows nothing about plumbing. The Trump administration’s many and utterly predictable travails with the press, the courts, and Constitution of the United States have prompted from many quarters comparisons with the Nixon administration’s disastrous unravelling by the Watergate scandal. James Clapper finds these comparisons pathetic and so do I. Whatever one thinks Richard Nixon and the abuse of power that ended his presidency, it is an objective fact that President Trump would be improved fundamentally if he were able to bring a fraction of the competence Nixon applied to the office.

Edward Luce submits that ‘if America’s political system were working as it should, Donald Trump would be on his way out,’ as Congress would have started impeachment proceeding or the people around Trump would have declared him unfit for office.\* Yet the Republican Party nominated Trump and then rallied to his election against all better judgement in a year in which it more likely than not that their nominee would win against that of the incumbent party, and thereby completed the capture of their party by populist insurgency that has gnawed its foundations since the 1970s. While it is possible that the erratic course of the Trump presidency may soon produce circumstances that move responsible Republicans to revisit their conscience, we have in the United States the absurd situation in which ‘obstruction of justice’ whispers down the corridors of the Capital Building yet any Republican who thinks of standing up to the president risks ‘an electronic lynching that could finish their career.’\* It is worthwhile remembering that where the obstruction of justice and impeachment trials have been connected, it took Richard Nixon six and Bill Clinton seven years in office to fall into a state of legal and political jeopardy that Trump has brought about in scarcely five months.

## **II The Betrayal of NATO**

The drama before us would be less worrying, if it were staged in some lesser member of the democratic community. But when the world’s preeminent power – a power moreover that, whatever its fault, achieved pre-eminence in part due its democratic decency – delivers itself into the hands of such malignant incompetence, the damage to the prestige of democratic governance internationally is substantive. This especially when the President of the United States publicly doubts the validity of NATO, demonstrates slight regard for the German chancellor and the British prime minister yet gushes admiration for ‘strong leadership’ Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a leadership that among other things involves contempt for independent courts and the outright murder of the free press.\* Charles Lane recently pointed out that Trump has repudiated the spirit of the Kennedy inaugural of 1961 – bearing any burden, supporting any friend, opposing any foe – in preference for a foreign policy of vindictive smallness.\* That spirit led the United States more than once into foreign adventures with disastrous consequences and national humiliation, yet it also entailed largeness of purpose and courage worthy of a great power. The spirit of the Kennedy inaugural was echoed twenty years later in Reagan’s, demonstrating that when strength of conviction failed one party it recovered in the other.



Admittedly, the unravelling of NATO can hardly be booked to Trump alone. If fatigue with international leadership has finally moved Americans to withdrawal, the burden in an alliance in which too many member-states have for too long been present in principle but absent in practice provides a large part of the explanation. President Obama's disinterest in foreign policy generally and indifference to Europe specifically had already eroded NATO's vitality, after President Bush had taken many of its member-states well out of their comfort zone. Sixteen years of doing too much far beyond Europe and then too little on its very periphery has been disorienting. And that comfort zone, after all, is in many instances rather small. Which brings the discussion to Britain. In Teresa May's awkward press conference with Donald Trump on April 27, the two leaders joked about the special relationship without actually saying that the special relationship was a joke. Yet here was the British prime minister visiting Britain's principal ally after her country had abandoned a forty-four year commitment to Europe and assuring the president that all things were otherwise normal. This is not the first time that Britain's political class assumed a special relationship with a people across an ocean without acknowledging such a relationship with another people across a channel, but by 2017 one would have thought it more embarrassing.


### III Britain and European Integration

In principle of course Britain's commitment to NATO remains as firm as ever. Its commitment to European security specifically may have to deepen if it is to compensate in any measure for the Trump administration's indifference.\* It is seldom appreciated in EU circles how significantly NATO has contributed to European integration. For France, recently recommitted to the European project by a newly-elected centrist president and a favourable legislative majority, the furthering of common European security goals nevertheless cannot assume robust support from an inward-turning British government, with the consequence that France's dependence on its traditional partnership with Germany has increased just as Germany's authority within the EU generally has been magnified by the Euro crisis. Intensified Franco-German security cooperation is an inherently wholesome goal, but will have to take the task of actual security more seriously than has NATO recently, rather than celebrate the fact of official cooperation as an achievement in itself - complete with high profile summitry and an array of spanking new acronyms for joint initiatives. President Macron has been forthright in his ambition to drive the EU forward, possibly toward a German acceptance of fiscal union in exchange for French structural reforms. It is a long shot, but were it to come about it would put Britain in an invidious position of witnessing the concentration of continental power it has worked for centuries to avoid.


Yet there are real dangers for future European integration freed even from British heresies about its inherent wonderfulness. European firms and consumers have profited mightily from the Single Market, but bureaucrats in Brussels and national European governments assumed too much from popular acquiescence for ever-greater increments in supranational authority. In 2005 the electorates of France and the Netherlands, two founding members of the European Community, rejected a draft European constitution. And there are popular constituencies all over Europe for the resentments and fears that UKIP exploited so adroitly in Britain's referendum. The EU regulates too much and much of it not well. The reigning ideology of European integration in Brussels and beyond reacts to doubt and scepticism with contempt. A major scholar of the EU's history notes that its Europeanism consists in large part of 'a secular faith that it is the ordained agent of human progress.'\*

Because the politics of Brexit have certain broad similarities with the populist convulsion that brought Trump to power, Prime Minister May ought to have considered that a large part of the electoral constituency supporting her party possibly does not like Americans any more than it likes Europeans. But that is beside the point. More interesting is the fact that, although the public mood in America and Britain is roiled by many of the same issues, the constitutional


[Continued on page 11](#)



This book explores the forces that impelled China, the world's largest socialist state, to make massive changes in its domestic and international stance during the long 1970s. Fourteen distinguished scholars investigate the special, perhaps crucial part that the territory of Hong Kong played in encouraging and midwifing China's relationship with the non-Communist world. In the Long 1970s China moved dramatically and decisively toward much closer relations with the non-Communist world, and also embarked on major economic reforms, designed to win it great power status by the early twenty-first centuries. The volume addresses the long-term implications of China's choices for the outcome of the Cold War and in steering the global international outlook toward free-market capitalism. Decisions made in the 1970s are key to understanding the nature and policies of the Chinese state today and the worldview of current Chinese leaders.




The protection of the homeland is the top priority for U.S. national security strategy. Strategic defense, however, has been an overlooked dimension in the vast literature on the U.S. strategic posture, with even less attention given to the necessity and dynamics of security collaboration within North America. Drawing on the expertise of scholars from the U.S., Canada and Mexico, the book offers a wide range of perspectives on recent trends in, and future prospects for, the military and political evolution of North American strategic defense.



‘This book is a tremendous achievement. On the basis of a multi-archival approach, Kieninger shows the importance of continuity in U.S. foreign policy from the 1960s to the 1970s. The East-West ‘bridge-builders’ in Washington, DC, skillfully managed to survive the change of administration from Johnson to Nixon. Kieninger also demonstrates persuasively that détente was in fact a progressive and dynamic policy that decisively contributed to bringing about the end of the Cold War. The book is well-written and full of insights, and convincingly reinterprets the prevalent narrative of the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s.’

— Klaus Larres, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill



Winner of the Cambridge University Press-TSA Book Prize for 2016 titles. This book provides the first analysis of the Trilateral Commission and its role in global governance and contemporary diplomacy.

Based on extensive archival research, this book moves beyond anecdotal accounts of elite networks and provides the first ‘inside view’ of the Trilateral Commission. In 1973, David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski founded the Trilateral Commission. Involving highly influential people from business and politics in the US, Western Europe, and Japan, the Commission was soon perceived as constituting an embryonic or even shadow world government. As the first researcher to have accessed the Commission’s archives, the author argues that this study demonstrates that global governance and international diplomacy should be considered a product of overlapping elite networks that merge informal and formal spheres across national borders.



### Atlantic Storm – Continued

circumstances and political dynamics of populist urgencies are qualitatively different. The combination of post-industrial dislocation and globalized commerce has in many respects made the urban-provincial divide in Britain even more stark than in the United States, especially in light of the radiance that London and The City project over a smaller population and territory. But there is no British equivalent of an independent Congress colonized constituency-by-constituency by a vast array of lobbies seeking either regulatory forbearance or a skewed tax code, or both. Although the American system is more democratic than Britain's, it responds more slowly and haltingly to electoral demands for change. The constitution provided for frequent elections to reveal what The People want; separated powers and federalism are there to make sure they don't get it.

British parliamentary democracy contrives, increasingly imperfectly, to furnish the strongest party in parliament with a stable governing majority with far fewer brakes on the whim of the elected executive. The two of the most durable parliamentary majorities in British politics, the Thatcher-Major governments of 1979-1997, and the Blair-Brown governments of 1997-2010, together reformed and consolidated the terms of a neo-liberal political economy. Not only was membership in the European market a central part of process, but Britain played a central role in the development of the Single European Act that ultimately turned the European Community into the European Union. Whereas early opposition to the Thatcher revolution came from the Labour Party and public sector unions, opposition to its long-term consequences and implications has come from traditional electoral constituencies of the Conservative Party. It was an attempt by Prime Minister David Cameron to neuter such opposition within his own majority – as if that were possible – that led to the referendum on EU membership, the unleashing of that opposition upon malleable public opinion, the humiliating defeat of Cameron's policy at the polls.

### IV The People

Thus, electoral change in the two most important states in the Atlantic Community has inflicted on their citizens and the rest of us an absurd situation: President Trump attempts to govern as if he had broad authoritarian powers, while Prime Ministers Cameron and May, both products of the robustly elitist culture of the Conservative Party, feel oddly obliged not only to consult The People on great issues of national and international import but also to be bound by their decision, as if the United Kingdom were a Swiss canton and the matter at issue a tax deduction. The relentless democratization of the American constitutional system, combined with the remorseless dumbing-down of national political discourse has given the United States the least competent government of its modern history. In much shorter order the Conservative Party alone has managed to inflict paralysis and deep disunity on the once United Kingdom. Martin Wolf observes that contemporary conservatism is burying the legacies of Reagan and Thatcher, that their policies 'underestimated the enduring functions of states as insurers, as protectors, as funders of education and health, as providers of infrastructure, as suppliers of public goods, as managers of externalities, regulators of monopolies, as stabilizers of economies, as redistributors of incomes and not least as the focus of political loyalties.'\* And yet our recent troubles were not an inevitable consequence of these errors. While the global retreat of Western liberalism has been self-evident for a decade, Henry Luces reminds us that 'Brexit was not bound to happen' but rather the outcome of "a rash throw of the dice by an inept prime minister,' while some 77,000 Midwestern votes were the difference between a Trump and a Clinton presidency.\*

Even had both these upheavals been avoided, since 2008 a review of the priorities of public policy in the Atlantic world is past due. Too many voters are or perceive themselves to be the losers in the millennial capitalist transformation unleashed in the 1980s, for which governments in the United States and the European Union have been primary agents. It is true that the Anglo-American democracies have been far and away the most uncritical enthusiasts of the majesty of the market and thus primary victims of the

### Atlantic Storm - Continued

deregulatory fevers it entailed.\* Udo di Fabio's observation that the sovereign State remains the cornerstone of international order and of the legal protection of basic human rights is simply a demonstrable fact. He adds that liberal commerce among sovereign states does not in principle undermine their sovereignty and would not do so in practice as long as it is not assumed to entail the removal of *any and all* regulations of commerce.\*

Yet it would be disturbing if the legacy of Reagan and Thatcher were overthrown wholesale, as seems to be the preference of those who oppose liberal trade in principle rather than to rectify the imbalances it is bound to produce. It is not liberal commerce and intensified global trade that in 2008 made road kill of so many inattentive yet guiltless and justly furious citizens of the advanced democratic world. Rather, it was the unfettered dominance of finance and financial institutions that has done so much to pervert the priorities of economic policy. And this dominance need not have been an integral feature of millennial capitalism. The US had completed a decade of unprecedented boom before the overthrow Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 at the hands of a Republic legislature and the signature of a Democratic president. The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's pact with anarchy has ever since troubled the American economy to an extent that Dodd-Frank reforms could not reverse, even as the Trump administration and Congress collude to dismantle Dodd-Frank.\*

Which brings us to those angry voters who somehow thought it prudent to vote for a Wall Street real estate speculator and celebrity of reality television to protest their marginalization by the market. Similarly awkward turns of logic were present on the Leave side of UK referendum, and its energy was no doubt quickened by the smug confidence of the Remain side. The People have much to answer for here, not only in terms of recent electoral flux but also for a malignant contempt for politics. We are daily treated to reminders of the ways in which democratic governments are failing the expectations of their population, as well as of the fact that public life in Western democracies no longer attracts the leadership talent modern government so badly needs. We rarely hear of the ways in which those populations fail the requirements of democratic citizenship. We have since last summer been treated to no end of satire about the legions of the ignorant, proud of their ignorance, who voted for Britain to leave the EU and Trump to move into the White House. But blissfully unaware of its own ignorance is the other side of the electoral divide, the nominally-educated and prosperous middle class voters that daily devote more thought to the correct wine than they give to the prudent vote when occasionally invited to cast a ballot. Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert tell them what to think - and they obediently think it. After decades of getting better government than they deserved Western publics are now at last getting exactly the government they deserve, run by people 'who could not survive an election campaign saying so little so often if people paid attention.'\* Unless and until The People do pay attention beyond the comfort zone of their tribal vanities, expect the downward spiral to continue.

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**The TSA will return to the UK in 2019.**

*18th Annual Conference*

*Lancaster University, England*

*8-10 July 2019*

## REPORT ON THE TRANSATLANTIC WOMEN III CONFERENCE

**THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSATLANTIC WOMEN CONFERENCE** organized in Dublin, Ireland was co-sponsored by the Catharine Maria Sedgwick Society and the Harriet Beecher Stowe Society; the sponsors of the earlier conferences included also the Margaret Fuller Society. The Transatlantic Women first convened in 2008 in Oxford, UK, at the Rothermere American Institute at Oxford University, followed by a second conference in Florence, Italy, in 2013. These conferences led to the publication of edited collections that have advanced the study of women in the Atlantic world: *Transatlantic Women: Nineteenth-Century American Women Writers and Great Britain* (eds. Beth L. Lueck, Brigitte Bailey, and Lucinda Damon-Bach, 2012) and *Transatlantic Conversations: Nineteenth-Century American Women Encounters with Italy and the Atlantic World* (eds. Beth L. Lueck, Sirpa Salenius, and Nancy Lusignan Schultz, 2016).



This third Transatlantic Women conference was held on 21-22 June 2018, at the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin, Ireland. The nearly 40 registered participants represented an international gathering of scholars. In addition to the keynote speaker, Dr. Rita Bode, who is from Canada, the speakers came from England, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Scotland, and the United States. It was with great pleasure that we witnessed the growing number of doctoral students among those presenting their papers; there were nine graduate students from the United States and Europe. This year, for the first time, the Transatlantic Women offered a Student Essay Prize for the best graduate student paper.

At this year's conference, the Transatlantic Studies Association generously sponsored a session entitled "Transatlantic Politics and World Affairs." Dr. Whitney Womack Smith, a member of TSA, chaired the session, with Dr. Sirpa Salenius, also a member of TSA, in the audience. The panelists examined the Fenian sisterhood, Gaelic revival, and Irish industry; they discussed the political transatlantic voice of women and agency of Irish immigrants:

"'We Have Much Faith in Bridget': Representations of the Fenian Sisterhood in the American Press" Patrick J. Mahoney, Drew University

"'Ladies Are in the Majority': Female Participation in the Gaelic Revival in the United States" Siobhra Aiken, National University of Ireland, Galway

"Ishbel, Lady Aberdeen, Irish Industry and the Chicago World's Fair, 1893" Joanne Paisana, University of Minho





### Transatlantic Women III - Continued

The TSA and its logo appeared in the program, both on the front cover and final page, with acknowledgement of the TSA's generous support of the event. In addition to indicating TSA sponsorship in the program, TSA material such as the annual Call for Papers was inserted in the conference welcome package that was handed to each participant. The funds were used to cover expenses, such as coffee breaks. The Transatlantic Women conference is appreciative of the support of the TSA, and we hope to develop further collaborations in the future.

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
**Whitney Womack Smith**  
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### Special Intelligence Relationship - Continued

Brexit has clearly complicated the issue. But as the Special Intelligence Relationship in its heyday demonstrated, you do not have to be in a free trade relationship to cooperate over intelligence matters. Past heads of agency in the UK have issued remarks like, never set foot on the Continent of you can help it, and the closer they are to the Med, the less trustworthy people are. We don't need people like that anymore, and the world needs new kinds of trust. If London can trust Brussels once more it may regain its self-respect and thus American respect, and a more modest version of the SIR may still win redemption.

**Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones**  
University of Edinburgh  
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
*In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence*  
(Oxford University Press, 2013)



*Human Rights after Hitler* reveals thousands of forgotten US and Allied war crimes prosecutions against Hitler and other Axis war criminals based on a popular movement for justice that stretched from Poland to the Pacific. These cases provide a great foundation for twenty-first-century human rights and accompany the achievements of the Nuremberg trials and postwar conventions. They include indictments of perpetrators of the Holocaust made while the death camps were still operating, which confounds the conventional wisdom that there was no official Allied response to the Holocaust at the time. This history also brings long overdue credit to the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), which operated during and after World War II.


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**THE MAIN TIDE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARSHIP ON THE FIRST YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II SWEEPS TOWARD COLD WAR**



**ACCOUNTS.** These have emphasized the United States and USSR in a context of geopolitical rivalry, with concomitant attention upon the bristling security state. Historians have also extensively analysed the creation of an economic order (Bretton Woods), mainly designed by Americans and tailored to their interests, but resisted by peoples residing outside of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. This scholarship, centred on the Cold War as vortex and a reconfigured world economy, is rife with contending schools of interpretation and, bolstered by troves of declassified archival documents, will support investigations and writing into the future.

By contrast, this book examines a past that ran concurrent with the Cold War and interacted with it, but which usefully can also be read as separable: Washington in the first years after World War II, and in response to that conflagration, sought to redesign international society. That society was then, and remains, an admittedly amorphous thing. Yet it has always had a tangible aspect, drawing self-regarding states into occasional cooperation, mediated by treaties, laws, norms, diplomatic customs, and transnational institutions. The U.S.-led attempt during the first postwar years to salvage international society focused on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Acheson-Lilienthal plan to contain the atomic arms race, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to force Axis leaders to account, the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the founding of the United Nations. None of these initiatives was transformative, not individually or collectively. Yet they had an ameliorative effect, traces of which have touched the twenty-first century—in struggles to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, bring war criminals to justice, create laws supportive of human rights, and maintain an aspirational United Nations, still striving to retain meaningfulness amid world hazards. Together these partially realized innovations and frameworks constitute, if nothing else, a point of moral reference, much needed as the border between war and peace has become blurred and the consequences of a return to unrestraint must be harrowing.



The story of surveillance in Britain and the United States - from the detective agencies of the late nineteenth century to the era of wikileaks and the Snowden revelations in the twenty-first. *We Know All About You* provides a salutary assessment of the dangers of the surveillance society in which we live today.

Defining surveillance as espionage on a mass scale, *We Know All About You* argues that it originated in nineteenth century America when credit companies kept tabs on more than a million businessmen, and when overseers subjected slaves to the minutest scrutiny. The book supplies an overview of government surveillance practices, and examines the Church Committee's 1970s notion that they began with FDR. It argues that because of anti-statist attitudes private surveillance is a neglected issue, that Lord Vansittart was a British McCarthy, and that the invigilation of the workplace and consumers remains an unresolved Transatlantic problem.

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### AMERICAN POLITICS, HISTORY AND LAW: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY DIALOGUE

CENTRE FOR AMERICAN LEGAL STUDIES, SCHOOL OF LAW,  
BIRMINGHAM CITY UNIVERSITY, MONDAY, 30TH JULY 2018

The Centre for American Legal Studies at BCU and the Monroe Centre at Reading University are pleased to announce a call for papers for their conference on *American Politics, History and Law: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue*.

[www.bcu.ac.uk](http://www.bcu.ac.uk)

### COMMON GROUND CONFERENCE: DIVIDED SELVES AND SOCIETIES IN IRISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, BELFAST  
26 - 27 OCTOBER 2018

This conference will provide researchers with an opportunity to disseminate current research, as well as investigating, on an interdisciplinary basis, the racial, ethnic, political, religious, sex-gender, sexual, class and economic divides that dominate debates about American and Irish culture. Whilst the conference draws on contemporary formulations of division, it also welcomes papers that offer historical perspectives on disunity in Irish and American literature and culture.

<https://commongroundsymposium.wordpress.com>

### DEMOCRACY AND DISINFORMATION IN THE ERA OF TRUMP

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN, 10-11 DECEMBER 2018

Are we in the end-times of liberal democracy in the United States? For some years, Americans have been losing faith in institutions, civil norms, and perhaps the idea of America itself. The question has been dramatically sharpened by the election and presidency of Donald Trump.

This conference brings together journalists, scholars and activists to converse about American political realities and unrealities today, and to share insights on reimagining and rebuilding a democratic polity.

<http://www.ucdclinton.ie>



\*For extended TSA materials and reviews see  
[www.transatlanticstudies.com](http://www.transatlanticstudies.com).

\*For article citations please contact the authors.



The Aula Maxima  
University College Cork  
July 2017

Photography by Tomás Tyner, except where otherwise noted.  
See [ttyner.photoshelter.com](http://ttyner.photoshelter.com)

## NOTED PUBLICATIONS

- 1) Priscilla Roberts and Odd Arne Westad, *China, Hong Kong, and the Long 1970s: Global Perspectives*, in Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
- 2) *North American Strategic Defense in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Security and Sovereignty in an Uncertain World*, eds. Christian Leuprecht, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Thomas Hughes (Springer, 2018).
- 3) Stephan Kieninger, *Dynamic Détente: The United States and Europe, 1964-1975*, in The Harvard Cold War Studies Series (Lexington Books, 2016).
- 4) Dino Knudsen, *The Trilateral Commission and Global Governance: Informal Elite Diplomacy, 1972-82* (Routledge, 2016).
- 5) *Transatlantic Women: Nineteenth-Century American Women Writers and Great Britain*, eds. Beth L. Lueck, Brigitte Bailey, and Lucinda Damon-Bach (New Hampshire, 2012) and *Transatlantic Conversations: Nineteenth-Century American Women's Encounters with Italy and the Atlantic World*, eds. Beth L. Lueck, Sirpa Salenius, and Nancy Lusignan Schultz (New Hampshire, 2016).
- 6) Dan Plesch, *Human Rights After Hitler: The Lost History of Prosecuting Axis War Crimes* (Georgetown University Press, 2017).
- 7) David Mayers, *America and the Postwar World: Remaking International Society, 1945-1956*, in Routledge Studies in Modern History (Routledge, 2018).
- 8) Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *We Know All About You: The Story of Surveillance in Britain and America* (Oxford University Press, 2017).

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